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"Trials are necessarily surrounded with 
evidentiary rules developed to safeguard 
men from dubious and unjust convictions ... 
but, before trial, we deal with probabilities 
only .•. and these are not technical, but are 
the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable men, not 
legal technicians, act. 
W.T. McGowan, Jr. 
Senior Civil - Criminal Judge 
Florence County, S.C. 
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OFFICER: "If, in fact, you have nothing to do 
with any of this, you have nothing to 
fear from us. In other words, you have 
nothing to lose. On the other hand, if 
you are involved, then it will come 
around you." 
ACCUSED: (SILENCE) 
OFFICER: "You know English (co-defendant) has 
tied you into it." 
ACCUSED: "I won't sign nothin', but I'll tell 
you about it." 
The accused then made a full confession that 
was used at trial against him. He was convicted 
and appealed, claiming that the confession was 
unlawfully obtained, although full Miranda warnings 
were given. The Court, holding the confession 
inadmissable, gave a detailed explanation of why 
it did so: 
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"During the initial interview by FBI agents 
(4:30PM) following his arrest, Clark (accused) 
indicated his desire to speak with an attorney 
prior to answering any questions. 
" 'If the individual states that he wants an 
attorney, the interrogation must cease until 
an attorney is present' . Miranda v. Arizona, 
16 Led 2d 694. 
"The Government recognizes this principle, 
but insists that Clark, at the subsequent 
interview, waived his right to counsel and 
voluntarily confessed to the offense charged. 
"We recognize the possibility that, under 
given circumstances, an accused may later 
waive a right which he previously asserted. 
Dillon v. US, 351 F 2d 433. However, evidence 
that an accused has previously asserted his 
right to confer with counsel is a factor which 
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weighs heavily against a finding that a 
subsequent, uncounseled confession is 
voluntary. US v. Slaughter, 366 F 2d 833. 
"Additionally, we note that agent Kenny (FBI) 
stated unequivocally that he initiated the 
interview during which Clark allegedly waived 
his right to speak with an attorney, and 
confessed. This initiation of the subsequent 
interview at which the confession was 
elicited is a factor which, under these 
circumstances, is a strong indication of 
involuntariness. 
"There is nothing in the record to suggest 
that (FBI) agent Kenny's decision to conduct 
a second interrogation of Clark was prompted 
by any manifestation on the part of Clark 
that he had changed his mind and desired to 
be interrogated without the assistance of 
counsel; 'Once the privilege has been asserted, 
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... an interrogator must not be permitted to 
seek its retraction, total or otherwise.' 
US v. Crisp, 435 F 2d 354. 
"Less than four hours had elasped between the 
time Clark stated that he wanted to talk with 
an attorney ... and the time he confessed; 
obviously this was an insufficient time for 
Clark ... to retain counsel. At the very least, 
the agents should have afforded Clark sufficient 
time to employ and consult with counsel before 
they initiated any subsequent interview." 
CONCLUSION 
The Clark Rule (US v. Clark, 499 F 2d 802) might 
be stated as follows: 
1. Once an accused has refused to talk, making 
known his wishes to consult an attorney, 
interrogating officers may not initiate further 
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discussion with him until after he has seen 
an attorney. 
2. Even though an accused has refused to talk, 
and has stated that he wishes to consult an 
attorney, his statement may be taken, after 
I 
Miranda warnings, if the accused's change of 
mind is entirely his own idea ... not suggested 
by police officers. 
' 
3. After an accused has consulted with an attorney, 
his statement may be taken, after Miranda 
warnings, even though the officers suggest 




RELATED BY INFORMER 
It has long been established that a police 
officer may obtain a search warrant based upon 
information given to him by a reliable informer. 
But, may a search warrant be issued when the 
information given by the informer is not first-
hand, but has been told to the informer by someone 
else? The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
given a qualified approval of such procedure. 
(US v. Neal, 500 F 2d 305) The Court said in Neal: 
HEARSAY INFORMATION 
"It is now well settled that the facts and 
circumstances upon which a magistrate may 
find probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant may be based on reliable 
hearsay information of criminal activity 
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furnished by an unidentified informer. It 
has also been held that a reviewing court 
should give substantial consideration to the 
determination of probable cause by a 'neutral 
and detached magistrate'." 
WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE? 
"It is generally recognized that probable 
cause is one of probabilities, and a valid 
warrant may issue when the circumstances before 
a proper official are such that a person of 
reasonable prudence would believe that a crime 
was being committed on the premises to be 
searched or evidence of a crime was being 
concealed there. 
"Trials are necessarily surrounded with 
evidentiary rules 'developed to safeguard men 
from dubious and unjust convictions' .•• but 
before trial we deal only with probabilities 
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that 'are not technical; they are the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life 
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act." 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ... Chapter 106 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
il GIVEN BY CO-TENANT 
Police investigating an armed robbery went to 
an appartment and asked permission to search ••. 
Permission was given by a co-tenant, search with-
out a warrant was made, and crime weapon was found. 
Search was lawful because permission was obtained 
from the co-tenant. US v. Jenkins, 496 F 2d 57. 
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FALSE INFORMATION 
GIVEN BY INFORMER 
~ 
Information given to a police officer by a 
'reliable informer', upon which a search warrant 
was issued and criminal evidence found, was later 
proven to have been a lie .•. the defendant asked the 
court to suppress the evidence on the ground that 
the informer was not truly 'reliable'. 
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A Federal Court ruled that the officer could 
rely upon what an informer told him when the 
informer had previously been reliable ••• the evidence 
was admitted even though the information actually 
given was false. US v. Garofalo, 496 F 2d 510. 
STATEMENT MADE 
AFTER INITIAL REFUSAL 
A defendant was arrested, but refused to talk, 
saying he wished to see his attorney ... Later, the 
defendant made incriminating statements before he 
saw the lawyer ••• statements were not the result of 
police questioning ••• for that reason, they were 
admissable. US v. Menichino, 497 F 2d 935. 
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1 RETURN' ON SEARCH 
WARRANT NOT MADE 
At trial, defense attorneys made the point that 
officers had not made an inventory 'return' to the 
magistrate after execution of a search warrant ... 
arguing that such failure invalidated the search. 
The Federal Court held that such things, although 
required by law, do not make a search unlawful nor 
render the evidence inadmissable. US v. Neal, 500 F 
2d 305. 
PROBABLE CAUSE NOT 
EXISTING AT TIME 
'Probable cause' to issue a search warrant 
must exist at the time the warrant is issued ..• the 
fact that there was probable cause three months ago 
does not justify issuance of a search warrant today. 
US v. Neal, 500 F 2d 305. 
\ 
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MAGISTRATES AND RECORDERS 
MAY NOT REDUCE DUI CHARGES 
On October 30, 1974, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court ruled plainly for the first time that a 
magistrate or municipal judge may not reduce a DUI 
charge to a lesser offense, such as reckless driving. 
This does not mean that the arresting officer 
may not nol pros a DUI charge and issue another 
uniform traffic ticket preferring another charge. 
It does mean, however, that the trial judge does 
not have the authority to 'reduce' a DUI charge to 
another offense. If a DUI charge is to be dismissed 
and another charge substituted, the arresting officer 
must nol pros the DUI ticket and issue another 
ticket setting forth the new charge. 
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STATE V. FENNELL 
(SC- FILED 10-30-74) 
"On May 13, 1973 the respondent, Fannie Dubose 
Fennell, was charged by the State Highway Patrol 
with driving a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. She was served 
with a copy of a uniform traffic ticket requiring 
her to appear before Magistrate R.E. Wingard of 
Ninety Six, Greenwood County, South Carolina. She 
was tried before the magistrate and a jury on 
July 10, 1973, but the jury being unable to agree, 
a mistrial was ordered. The magistrate, thereafter, 
on the same day accepted from the respondent a plea 
of guilty of reckless driving, in lieu of proceeding 
further with respect to the offense with which she 
was charged. No warrant, uniform traffic ticket or 
other process had been issued charging the respondent 
with the offense of reckless driving. 
Still later on the same day, July 10, 1973, 
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the magistrate wrote the respondent a letter 
informing her that he had been in error in accepting 
a guilty plea to reckless driving and further 
informing her that the charge of driving under the 
influence of intoxicants would be set for retrial. 
The respondent appealed from such action by the 
magistrate and the circuit court issued its order 
· under date of January 12, 1974, holding that the 
magistrate was empowered to accept a guilty plea 
to the charge of reckless driving and that the State 
could not further prosecute the offense of driving 
under the influence of intoxicants. From such order 
the State appeals. 
Code section 46-343 makes it unlawful for 
"any person who is under the influence of 
intoxicating liquors *** to drive any vehicle within 
this State." Code section 46-342 provides that "Any 
person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to 
indicate either a wilful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless 
driving." 
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The ess2ntial question raised by the appeal is 
whether or not the lesser offense of "reckless 
driving" is included within the greater offense of 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors, 
the only offense with which respondent was properly 
charged. The general rule is that an indictment 
will sustain a conviction for a lesser offense 
included within a greater offense charged. See 
cases collected in West's South Carolina Digest, 
Indictment and Information, Key No. 189. This rule 
is elaborated upon in 42 C.J.S., Indictments and 
Informations, section 286, where it is said, 
"However, a conviction may be had of an offense 
different from the one specifically charged 
only when such offense is an essential element 
of that charged or when it is included in the 
offense charged, and only when the greater 
offense charged includes all the legal and 
factual elements of the lesser offense. 
(Emphasis supplied.)" 
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The rule is also elaborated upon in 41 Am.Jur.(2d), 
1074, Indictment and Information, section 313. 
We quote therefrom as follows: 
"The statement of the general rule necessarily 
implies that the lesser crime must be included 
in the higher crime with which the accused is 
specifically charged, and that the averment of 
the indictment describing the manner in which 
the greater offense was committed must contain 
allegations essential to constitute a charge 
of the lesser, in order to sustain a conviction 
of the latter offense. If the greater of two 
offenses includes all the legal and factual 
elements of the lesser, the greater includes 
the lesser, but if the lesser offense requires 
the inclusion of some necessary element not so 
included in the greater offense, the lesser is 
not necessarily included in the greater." 
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Numerous authorities have held that the 
statutory offense of reckless driving is not a 
lesser offense included within the statutory offense 
of driving under the influence, but that the two are 
separate and distinct offenses, each involving 
necessary elements of proof not included in the 
other. 
Section 46-871, 1973 Cum.Supp. to the Code, 
provides for the issuance of uniform traffic tickets 
and the vesting of traffic courts with jurisdiction 
to hear and dispose of charges for which such 
tickets are issued. 
Code section 43-111 provides: 
"All proceedings before magistrates in criminal 
cases shall be commenced on information under 
oath, plainly and substantially setting forth 
the offense charged, upon which, and only which, 
shall a warrant of arrest issue." 
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The issuance of either a uniform traffic ticket 
or a warrant charging a respondent with the offense 
of reckless driving was necessary to give the 
magistrate jurisdiction to dispose of that particular 
offense. Statev. Fraser, 173 S.C. 284,175 S.E. 551 
(1934); Town of Honea Path v. Wright, 194 S.C. 461, 
9 S.E. (2d) 924 (1940); Statev. Langford, 223 S.C. 20, 
73 S. E. (2d) 854 (1953). An accused cannot waive 
compliance with statutory requirements essential to 
the magistrate's acquiring jurisdiction of the 
particular offense. Town of Honea Path v. Wright, 
supra. 
Since reckless driving is not a lesser offense 
included within the offense of driving under the 
influence of intoxicants and respondent was not 
properly charged with the offense of reckless 
driving, it follows that the magistrate was without 
jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty to the 
offense of reckless driving and thereby dispose of 
the case. It follows that the circuit court was in 
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error and the judgment thereof is reversed. The 
cause is remanded to the lower court for the purpose 
of remanding the same to the magistrate's court." 
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